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1. Introduction
Loss of pilot awareness about the commanded autopilot descent modes is a specul
ated or reported cause in several recent incidents involving Airbus A320 aircraft [Lenoro
vitz, 1992b; Sparaco, 1994; Bateman, 1991].  With the new autopilot systems of this aircr
aft, the pilot can command several vertical flight path modes, including a specified Flight 
Path Angle or a specified Vertical Speed.  These two modes share the same selector knob
 and display, have only a simple push-button toggle to switch between them, and have si
milar mode indicators.  Therefore, the presentation and selection of these modes combine
d with the potentially severe consequences of an error generate several serious questions 
about the supervisory control task required of the pilot by these new systems.
1.1 Motivation
On January 20, 1992, an A320 aircraft crashed during a non-precision approach in
to Strasbourg airport, killing 86 passengers.  As shown in the flight profile in Figure 1.1, t
he descent rate of the aircraft has been estimated to be 3300 fpm, resulting in impact with
 high terrain.  This differs dramatically from the descent detailed in the approach plate; th
e aircraft should have followed a gradual 'step-down' approach, which can also be approx
imated by a 3.3 degree descent [Bateman, 1991; Strasbourg Instrument Approach Plate].  
Figure 1.1 -- Vertical Flight Profile A320 January 20, 1992 Strasbourg France
(Bateman, 1991)
It is speculated the flight crew inadvertently placed the aircraft into the wrong des
cent mode and did not recognize the problem during the following (approximately) 47 se
conds up to impact.  This problem with mode awareness may have been influenced by the
 command pilot's likely primary flight reference, a Heads Up Display (HUD) with no mo
de annunciation, and by the lack of a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) provid
ing early notification of an excessive descent rate (Lenorovitz, 1992a).
Two other incidents involved the same confusion about descent mode during appr
oach [Bateman, 1991].  Fortunately, the errors were recognized in time to prevent ground
 impact and were later reported by the pilots of the aircraft.  In the first case, a localizer a
pproach into Gatwick airport on July 3, 1988, a three degree descent was intended but the
 autopilot inadvertently was commanded to follow a vertical speed mode.  The aircraft de
scended well below its nominal flight path and triggered a GPWS warning, at which time 
the pilot executed a missed approach.
In the second case, a localizer backcourse approach into San Diego in June 1990, t
he intended flight path was also a three degree descent  but the autopilot was commanded
 to follow a vertical speed mode.  The flight crew was distracted and first reduced the co
mmanded vertical speed to 1200fpm, then descended well below their allowable altitudes
 still in vertical speed mode.  The error was recognized after approximately ten seconds a
nd the pilot was able to pull-up and execute a visual approach.
In all cases, the same excessive descent rate was commanded (or speculated to ha
ve been commanded) by inadvertently selecting a vertical speed rate corresponding to the
 desired flight path angle.  Although the time to recognize the erroneous descent mode dif
fered, a significant amount of time passed in each case, at best requiring recovery substan
tially below 'safe' altitudes.
1.2 Background
In modern air carrier aircraft, the aircraft trajectory can be controlled in three way
s: manual control by the pilot, automatic flight guidance over a specified route by a Flight
 Management System, and selected autopilot control over specified aircraft states.  This s
elected autopilot control is commanded by setting specified 'Modes'; for the vertical flight
 path these modes include Altitude Hold, Altitude Select, Vertical Speed, Approach, and 
Missed Approach.  In some of the new air transport aircraft, a new mode, Flight Path Ang
le, is also available. 
The primary display and selectors of autopilot modes and their target values are pr
esented on the Flight Control Unit (FCU), also called a Mode Control Panel in other aircr
aft.  The A320 FCU is illustrated in Figure 1.2.  This instrument is located in the center c
onsole on the glare-shield, within reach of both the captain and co-pilot.  The four rotary 
knobs can be used to select the desired state values of Speed, Heading or Track, Altitude, 
and Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle.  To select autopilot control over a particular stat
e, the pilot sets the desired state value and then pulls on the knob to command the mode g
overning that state.  An additional recessed push-button on the FCU toggles between the 
modes Vertical Speed or Flight Path Angle.  
Figure 1.2 A320 Flight Control Unit (FCU)
(Airbus A320 Flight Crew Operating Manual)
With the original A320 FCU, a selected vertical speed or flight path angle would 
both be shown as two digits, with a plus or minus sign indicating a climb or descent respe
ctively.  For example, descents at 3200 fpm ar at 3.2 degrees would be depicted as  '-32'.  
A retrofit modifies the display to show four digits in the case of a commanded vertical sp
eed [Sparaco, 1994].
When a mode is selected on the FCU, its target value is shown in its respective wi
ndow.  In addition, a text annunciation “VS” is shown on the FCU in white if Vertical Sp
eed is commanded.  If Flight Path Angle is selected, an “FPA” is shown, also in white, in 
the same area. The current autopilot modes are also annunciated at the top of each pilot's 
Primary Flight Display (PFD).  With flight directors selected, a standard flight director is 
shown on the PFD when the aircraft is in Vertical Speed mode, and an aircraft symbol sh
ows the actual flight path vector relative to that selected on the FCU.
The  pilot in the Strasbourg accident had a Heads Up Display (HUD) available for
 use as his primary flight reference [Lenorovitz, 1992b], depicted in Figure 1.3.  Mounted
 on top of the instrument panel, this display presents essential state information to the pilo
t while also allowing the pilot to see, through its glass surface, the forward out-the-windo
w view.  However, the HUD does not display any of the autopilot mode annunciations.  I
n certain conditions either the selected flight path angle or a default 3° flight path angle is
 shown by two sets of horizontal dashes, shown in Figure 1.3 at the 3° down position.
Figure 1.3 Airbus A320 HUD
(Baud & Tarnowski, 1990)
The pilots' vertical flight path mode awareness may be determined by several diff
erent factors.  First, the pilot is responsible for determining each autopilot mode through 
FCU selectors; when the selectors are distinct, this process becomes both functional (prog
ramming the autopilot) and symbolic (establishing a pilot awareness of the exact autopilo
t modes commanded).  Once the mode has been selected, the mode can be displayed thro
ugh both explicit autopilot mode annunciation and through presentation of the current and
 commanded aircraft states.  
Finally, the attention the pilot can dedicate to supervising the autopilot can affect 
his/her awareness of the commanded autopilot modes.  The Vertical Speed and Flight Pat
h Angle modes are often commanded during Terminal Area operations and on Final Appr
oach.  These phases of flight have a high pilot workload and require frequent changes in t
he aircraft guidance commands as the aircraft transitions from high-altitude cruise to the l
ow-level approach and landing.  On a non-precision approach, the pilot must also be conc
erned with obtaining visual contact with the runway, requiring significant 'Heads Up' tim
e.  Therefore, on Final Approach the pilot's available attention to supervisory roles may b
e limited.
1.3 Objectives
For the issues of vertical flight path mode awareness, the objectives of this study 
were:  
1)  To examine the length of time required by pilots to recognize both 
- a problem with the aircraft state (excessive vertical speed)
- the cause of the problem (incorrect autopilot mode), and 
2) To determine the primary and secondary display cues the pilots used for vertica
l flight path mode awareness.
In order to accomplish these objectives, a part-task simulation was developed on t
he MIT Advanced Cockpit Simulator.  This simulation was used to examine an inadverte
nt selection of Vertical Speed when a desired Flight Path Angle was intended, roughly m
odeling the situation speculated in the Strasbourg accident.  
2. Experiment Design
Using the MIT Advanced Cockpit Simulator (ACS), active airline pilots flew a se
ries of non-precision approaches with reference to a Heads Up Display (HUD), a Flight C
ontrol Unit (FCU) and other necessary instruments such as a Primary Flight Display (PF
D), and gear and flap indications.  During subject briefing, the pilots were told the use of 
the Flight Path Angle autopilot mode was being tested to allow for lower minimums in no
n-precision approaches.  They were asked to command the flight path angle, supervise th
e approach and complete the approach manually when visual contact was made with the r
unway.  During the fourth approach, an experimenter, acting as Pilot Not Flying, comma
nded Vertical Speed mode instead, and the pilots’ recognition time of the excessive vertic
al rate and its cause was recorded.  During a debriefing, the pilots were also asked for sub
jective comments about autopilot modes and their display.
This section details the setup of the MIT ACS and its displays.  Then the procedur
es followed during the experiment are described.
2.1 Simulator Setup
The MIT ACS is based upon two Silicon Graphics workstations.  The computers 
provide both the graphics emulating the cockpit displays and the computation to simulate 
the aircraft dynamics and to drive the ancillary controls.  This configuration used is illustr
ated in Figure 2.1.  A system of memory sharing between the two computers was develop
ed in order to spread the computational load and to allow for two synchronized graphics d
isplays presenting the same state information.  The aircraft has the level of performance a
pproximating a Boeing 737.  A side-stick was provided for manual control.  
HUD/
Window View
MCP/
PFD
Other Controls
Figure 2.1 Advanced Cockpit Simulator (ACS) Setup
A Head Up Display (HUD), based on the Flight Dynamics HUD, was situated in f
ront of the pilot.  Although it differs somewhat from the Sextant HUD shown in figure 1.
3, it presents similiar information.  A radar altimeter indication was shown at heights belo
w 500 feet above ground and no ground proximity aural alerts were given, imitating the 
Air Inter A320’s lack of a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS).  The HUD’s in b
oth the 3.2 degree and 3200 fpm descents are shown in Figure 2.2.  For the 3.2 degree des
cent, the flight path indicator is on the 3.2 degree position on the pitch angle scale.  For th
e 3200 fpm descent, the flight path angle is much steeper and the numerical value of -320
0 appears on the lower right.  
Horizon Line
Flight Path Indicator
Vertical Speed
Horizon Line
Flight Path Indicator
Vertical Speed
Figure 2.2
Heads Up Display (HUD) in 3.2° and 3200 fpm Descent 
Modes
An out-the-window view was presented behind the HUD symbology.  Until the ai
rcraft was below 1500 feet above ground, the flight was in Instrument Meteorological Co
nditions (IMC).  Below that altitude, a basic terrain map was depicted.  During the nomin
al approaches, an airport was shown on the ground with runways, taxiways, buildings and
 runway markings.  
All of the 'Heads Down' displays were shown on a second graphics screen, placed 
to the front and right of the pilot.  These displays included: a representation of the Flight 
Control Unit (FCU), a generic Primary Flight Display (PFD) modeled after those in the B
oeing 747-400 and Airbus A320, and miscellaneous indicators for gear and flaps.  
The PFD, depicted in 3.2 degree and 3200 fpm descents, is shown in Figure 2.3.  
Unlike the A320 PFD, this PFD displayed a flight path indicator without flight directors, i
ndicating the inertially derived true flight path of the aircraft.  For the 3.2 degree descent, 
the flight path indicator is at the -3.2 degree position on the pitch angle scale.  For the 320
0 fpm descent, the flight path angle is much steeper and the numerical value for vertical s
peed of 3200 appears in the lower right.  The vertical autopilot mode is shown on the top 
of the PFD, flight path angle (FPA) or vertical speed (V/S).
00
1Figure 2.3
Primary Flight Display (PFD) in 3.2° and 3200 fpm Des
cent Modes
The FCU displayed all annunciations and selected values in the same manner as t
he A320, but none of the selectors or dials could be used.  In order to change the modes a
nd values commanded by the FCU, the pilots were told to call out the settings they wante
d selected and an experimenter, acting as Pilot Not Flying, entered them via a keyboard.  
The FCU is shown in Figure 2.4 for descents of -3.2° and 3200 feet/min.  
Figure 2.4 
Flight Control Unit (FCU), Set for Descents of 3.2° and 
3200 fpm
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32.2 Experiment Procedure
The 12 subjects were current airline pilots.  They were briefed before the flights o
n the displays and controls of the simulator.  Special care was taken in explaining the HU
D, including the speed, pitch, altitude and vertical speed indicators, and in describing the 
modes available on the A320 and their differences from the subject pilot's normal aircraft
.  
The subjects were then told that the objectives of the study were to: Test use of H
eads Up Display (HUD) and new autopilot systems for non-precision approaches in low v
isibility.  They were told to execute a sequence of five final approaches in low visibility c
onditions by commanding the autopilot to follow a localizer and a specified flight path an
gle. After making visual contact with the runway they were to take manual control of the 
aircraft and, during the briefing, they were told that the point at which they took manual c
ontrol was the metric of interest.  
The pilots were given the Instrument Approach Plates for each approach.  These a
pproach plates show the correct flight path angle, and the DME distance at which it shoul
d be commanded.  An example approach plate is shown in Figure 2.5.  Then, the pilots w
ere allowed to both manually control the airplane at altitude and fly a practice approach.  
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Figure 2.5 Example Instrument Approach Plate
5At the start of each approach, the aircraft was two miles (approximately 40 second
s) outside of the Final Approach Fix (FAF).  Therefore, the start of the approach involved
 a high workload, during which the pilot had to consult his/her instrument approach plate,
 pre-select the required flight path angle, trigger the autopilot mode at the FAF, and start 
commanding appropriate landing speeds, flap positions and gear extension.  This high wo
rkload was chosen in order to simulate the workload induced  by the tasks found during a
n actual landing.  Once pilots were established on the approach and in landing configurati
on, pilot workload drops and subjects had ample time to monitor the approach and search 
for the runway through the HUD.  
The experiment objectives given to pilots were deliberately misleading.  By havin
g an emphasis on visual contact with the runway, it was hoped their attention would be o
n the HUD and 'out-the-window’, rather than fixating on the FCU and other 'heads down' 
displays.  
Instead of flying the five approaches for which they were initially briefed, the pilo
ts flew only four.  During the fourth approach, the erroneous Vertical Speed mode was tri
ggered by an experimenter, acting as Pilot Not Flying.  This gave the pilots three approac
hes to familiarize themselves with the systems.  It also avoided placing any special emph
asis on the vertical speed mode approach.
Once the pilot recognized the severe descent of the vertical speed mode approach 
and took any action to change it, the time of recognition was recorded.  If the pilot took n
o action the descent was allowed to continue until ground impact.  
After the last approach, pilots were asked several questions about their recognitio
n, or lack of recognition, of the extreme descent and its cause.  The form used to record th
is information is included as Appendix A.  The pilots were also invited to expand on their
 answers and provide any additional comments.  Other data recorded included the aircraft
 state data throughout the run, and a summary of the pilot's background information such 
as his/her flight experience, aircraft flown and age.
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3. Results
3.1 Subjects
Twelve air carrier pilots participated in this study.  Ten flew larger transport aircra
ft such as the MD-80 or Boeing 767; the remaining two flew commuter aircraft with glass
 cockpits.  Seven were captains and five were first officers, with an average of 9800 flight
 hours (the least experienced had 2200 hours, the most had 18,500 flight hours).  Seven h
ad received their initial flight training as civilians, the remaining five had originally been 
military pilots.  None of the pilots had flight experience in the Airbus A320 or had flown 
HUD equipped aircraft.
3.2 Recognition of Severe Descent and Incorrect Descent Mode
One pilot of the twelve immediately noticed the extreme pitch down of the aircraf
t on the HUD.  One pilot safely took manual control after the aircraft had descended appr
oximately 1500 feet.  Six pilots took control after a descent of approximately 2800 feet, 
when the aircraft was approximately 500 feet above ground level and the descent of 3200
 fpm was well established, which would have resulted in ground impact in the Strasbourg 
accident. Four of the pilots did not take action before the aircraft impacted the ground as i
t was set in the simulation.  These results are shown pictorially in Figure 3.1.
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7Figure 3.1
Descent Profile, Showing Points Where Subjects Took Action t
o End Severe Descent
The depicted altitudes indicate only the points at which the pilots were aware that 
a serious problem existed with the aircraft configuration and took action.  The pilots’ acti
ons in all but one case were to take manual control of the aircraft; the subject who immed
iately recognized the incorrect mode needed only to request that the mode be corrected, si
nce the aircraft had not yet descended signficantly below the glideslope.  Questioning rev
ealed that pilots who took manual control were reacting to the severe descent, the cause o
f which they had not been able to identify.  The pilots intended to stabilize the aircraft ma
nually and then attempt to ascertain the cause of this severe descent.
All of the pilots, even those who did not take any action, were confused and conce
rned by the increasing descent rate and its accompanying speed build up when in the una
nticipated Vertical Speed mode.  Some pilots attempted to reduce these particular aircraft 
states directly by requesting speed brakes and/or a somewhat shallower flight path angle (
not noticing the aircraft was in Vertical Speed Mode).  
In summary, only one pilot of the twelve recognized the incorrect autopilot mode 
before the simulation was stopped.  This pilot and one other took action at sufficient altitu
de to avoid ground impact.  Seven other pilots took action at 500 feet above ground, too l
ow to avoid ground impact and after an altitude loss greater than in the Strasbourg accide
nt.  The remaining four pilots collided with the ground in their simulation runs.  Although
 only two pilots took adequate action, all the pilots indicated a great deal of confusion and
 concern about the high descent rate and its accompanying nose-down attitude and build-
up of speed.
3.3 Variations in Recognition Based on Pilot Characteristics
The altitude at which pilots took action has been examined for differences betwee
n pilots with different characteristics.  No significant differences can be found between pi
lots with high and low levels of experience (as indicated by their flight hours), nor can dif
ferences be found between pilots of different ages.
Five of the twelve pilots received their initial flight training in the military.  Only t
wo of these five took action before the aircraft reached the ground, and at very low altitud
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es.  Of the seven pilots whose initial training was not military, two pilots recognized the e
rror at safe altitudes, four took action at low altitudes and only one did not take action.  T
he number samples is too small to provide any statistical significance.
Six pilots identified themselves as captains; four pilots identified themselves as fir
st officers.  Of the four flight officers, only one pilot took action (at a ‘safe’ altitude).   Of
 the six captains, only one pilot did not take action.   Again, there is not enough data to pr
ovide statistical significance.
3.4 Primary and Secondary Cues of Extreme Descent
By noting what the pilots said during the experiment, their simulation runs and the
 following debriefings, the dominant and supporting cues to the pilot of the extreme desce
nt were identified.  These did not appear to vary between the pilots who did or did not tak
e action, nor did they vary between pilots with any other identified characteristic.
During the simulation runs, all of the pilots commented on the high descent rate.  
During the debriefing, five of the eight pilots who took action cited it as the strongest cue 
to take action.  Another four pilots also cited it as a secondary cue.  The indication of the 
high descent rate was described by six of the pilots as exceeding a certain threshold (e.g. 
“The vertical speed shouldn’t be more than about 1000 fpm this low on an approach”) an
d by the other three as not conforming to a formula or cross-check they are accustomed to
 performing on approach (e.g. “Vertical speed should be about five times the ground spee
d.”)  One of the pilots indicated concern over the descent but then attributed it to the fligh
t path angle mode he believed was commanded at the time.
Another cue that was commented on by most of the pilots, once the descent rate w
as established, was the speed buildup that occurred as the autopilot attempted to maintain 
the high rate of descent.  In the debriefing, one pilot who took manual control cited this a
s the first cue of an abnormal situation; another two pilots also cited it as a supporting cue
.
Once the 3200 fpm vertical speed is established, the aircraft descends at a flight p
ath angle of approximately eight degrees.  This steep descent prevents the aircraft from m
aintaining the commanded approach speed.  With flaps fully extended, this caused the H
9UD’s aircraft attitude indicator to drop below the flight path vector.  This appearance of t
he HUD was cited by two pilots as the compelling cue for them to take action.  Another f
our pilots cited the extreme nose down attitude as a supporting cue in the debriefing.
The appearance of the radar altimeter on the HUD at 500 feet AGL was cited duri
ng the debriefing by only one pilot as a supporting cue.  However, seven of the pilots too
k action soon after this indication appeared on the HUD, suggesting that this indication w
as more compelling than the pilots’ after-the-fact responses indicate.
Another supporting cue, mentioned by two pilots, was a cross-check of the altitud
e with the distance to the threshold as shown by the Distance Measuring Equipment (DM
E).  These cross-checks were quite simple, usually a comparison between the fraction of a
ltitude descended to the fraction of the distance covered.
The mode annunciators on the PFD or FCU were noticed by only two pilots, and 
only after they had taken action.  Pilot comments indicate they did not feel the annunciato
rs were compelling because of their ‘heads-down’ location and similar appearances for di
fferent modes.
3.5 Pilot Subjective Opinions on Mode Presentation
During the debriefing, all the pilots felt the presentation of Flight Path Angle and 
Vertical Speed modes could be improved.  In free responses, six pilots stated that the mo
de annunciations should be made more distinct and identifiable.  Three pilots stated the se
lector for these two modes should be physically separated.  One suggestion was to use a d
ifferent color to highlight the ‘non-normal’ mode, although no opinion was given about w
hat should be the ‘normal’ mode.
Six pilots suggested mode annunciation or graphical cues on the HUD, although t
hree also expressed concerns about cluttering the HUD and information overload. Two pi
lots suggested aural alerts for ‘stupid’ mode selections.  One pilot suggested changes in th
e procedures used for selecting modes, such as calling out the mode and commanded stat
e value, with a response from the pilot-not-flying.
3.6 Simulation Fidelity
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During the debriefing, pilots were asked questions about the simulation fidelity.  
Eight of the pilots felt they understood the HUD and 10 of the pilots felt they understood 
the FCU.  10 of the pilots felt the workload in the simulation was realistic; one differing p
ilot felt the workload was too low, the other differing pilot felt the workload was too high
.  Overall, the pilots felt the simulation was realistic.
One aspect of the simulation that differs from normal approaches was the emphasi
s on the subject-pilot to recognize the error without relying on the experimenter-copilot.  
Recognition of the extreme descent and its cause would presumably happen more quickly
 in a two-crew cockpit.
Finally, the pilots used in this study were new to HUD’s, the mode Flight Path An
gle and the A320 Mode Control Panel.  Being relatively untrained in the use of Flight Pat
h Angle mode, their recognition may have been slower than that expected from flight cre
w trained on these systems.  
14. CONCLUSIONS
Several valuable conclusions about issues with vertical flight path mode awarenes
s can be made.  However, this experiment was not intended to examine any one aircraft’s 
exact displays or systems; any such studies would require further simulation with exact di
splays and pilots trained on these the specific systems.  
1) Most pilots showed a lack of awareness of the commanded descent mode and were con
fused by the resulting aircraft states.
All but one of the subjects allowed the aircraft to deviate significantly from the int
ended glide path, with ten pilots allowing the aircraft to reach altitudes where ground imp
act either happened or would be difficult to avoid.  This indicates that pilots had a serious
 lack of autopilot mode and aircraft state awareness when given the displays used in the st
udy.  All of the pilots were concerned and confused by the vertical speed, pitch attitude a
nd speed buildup that ensued from the descent, but many were reluctant to act because of 
confusion or a belief that these extreme states were required to maintain the expected flig
ht path angle.  
2) Pilots evaluated the condition of the aircraft by supervising aircraft states.
When flying the aircraft, the pilots monitored the aircraft states on their customar
y primary flight displays, rather than monitoring the commanded modes on the Mode Co
ntrol Panel.  This was shown by the pilots’ comments during the simulations, when all of 
them mentioned the numerical value of the vertical speed, and most mentioned airspeed a
nd/or altitude checks.  These states were evaluated in two ways: as comparisons to allowa
ble thresholds, such as “We should not be descending this fast”; and simple memorized r
ule manipulations, such as “Vertical speed should be five times the ground speed”.
3) The display cues cited by the pilots and the instruments in their scan suggest study of s
ome changes in mode presentation and pilot training.
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To monitor autopilot conformance, pilots must compare between mode annunciati
ons, commanded values selected on the Mode Control Panel, and the aircraft states show
n on their Primary Flight Displays and HUD.  This requires the pilot to reference several 
displays and compare between displays in different formats on different screens, sometim
es referencing states that are not distinctly quantified (such as Flight Path Angle).
Several simple display improvements were suggested by the pilots, including: phy
sical separation of the descent mode selectors and mode annunciations, more identifiable 
mode annunciations than just two or three letter identifiers, and the use of different colors
 for different modes.
More elaborate display improvements also warrant investigation.  For autopilot m
odes involving altitude and speed, the commanded state values are shown graphically on t
he same displays as the actual aircraft states.  This method of presentation reinforces the 
pilot’s awareness of the commanded modes and their target states, and allows for easy su
pervision of autopilot conformance.  These types of displays could also be shown when t
he autopilot is tracking a flight path angle or commanded vertical speed.  In addition, this 
type of display could be included in a HUD type display without adding text annunciators
.
Improvements in training and procedures were also suggested by some of the pilot
s.  For example, pilots frequently called out altitudes, DME distance and vertical speeds, 
but did not have a standard protocol for cross-checking these values with those selected o
n the Mode Control Panel.  Also, none of the pilots cross-checked the mode that was sele
cted by experimenter who was acting as co-pilot; such a procedure would help in quick d
etection of erroneous mode selection.
Finally, Flight Path Angle is a new autopilot mode that pilots are not accustomed t
o control manually.  Only in the most recent glass cockpit aircraft is any indication of the 
flight path vector shown, and then only in reference to a pitch ladder on the direction indi
cator.  This autopilot mode and any other mode referencing unfamiliar states requires add
itional pilot training so that they can quickly predict the underlying dynamics of the aircra
ft condition they are commanding, and thus monitor its conformance.  
Appendix A:  Pilot Questionnaire
3This appendix contains the minimum question list asked verbally of all subjects:  
1) Did you notice the change in Vertical Speed mode from the requested mode?
Yes No
2) If yes, when did you notice?
3) What cues first warned you of the problem?
4) What other instruments did you check to verify the problem?
5) What comments do you have about the presentation of the current autopilot modes?
6) Did you understand the HUD?
7) Did you understand the A320 Mode Control Panel?
8) Was the workload during the experiment similar to what you normally find during a fi
nal approach?
9) Comments:
44
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